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SUBJECTIVE MATERIALITY
AND THE OVER-THE-COUNTER
DERIVATIVES MARKETS
INTRODUCTION
In July of 2010, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) reached a settlement agreement with Goldman, Sachs & Co.
(Goldman) after almost three months of negotiating and legal postur-
ing.' The deal's announcement marked one of the largest penalties in
Wall Street's history,2 underscoring the dispute's significance both to
the litigants and to the general investing public.3 As part of the settle-
ment, Goldman agreed to pay $550 million, including $535 million in
civil penalties.4 Although Goldman neither admitted nor denied
wrongdoing, the firm acknowledged that it made a "mistake" by fail-
ing to disclose to investors that the third party responsible for select-
ing and packaging a reference portfolio of collateralized debt
1. The SEC filed its complaint on April 16, 2010. Complaint, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010). Goldman signed the consent on July 14, 2010. Con-
sent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010). The company's executives contend that they were not given any ad-
vance notice of the suit or the opportunity to settle the dispute before the SEC filed the com-
plaint. Susanne Craig et al., Firm Contends It Was Blindsided by Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19,
2010, at Al.
2. Susanne Craig & Kara Scannell, Goldman Settles Its Battle with SEC, WALL ST. J., July 16,
2010, at Al.
3. The SEC was facing increased public criticism after failing to prevent the frauds perpe-
trated by Bernie Madoff and Alan Stanford. Richard A. Sauer, Editorial, Why the SEC Missed
Madoff, WALL ST. J., July 17-18, 2010, at A13. The Goldman dispute exemplified the SEC's
new focus on mortgage-lending activities and was seen as setting the tone for future enforcement
actions, despite its lack of precedential value. See Monica Langley et al., SEC Chiefs Big Bet on
Goldman, WALL ST. J., May 15-16, 2010, at Al. The case presented the possibility of disgorge-
ment and penalties, and an unfavorable disposition at trial could have impacted the likelihood of
civil suits filed by institutional investors concerning the same conduct. See Jessica Hodgson &
Madeleine Nissen, RBS, IKB Weigh Goldman Suits, WALL ST. J., July 17-18, 2010, at B2. At the
same time, Goldman was easy fodder for the news media, given the prevailing social, economic,
and political backdrop.
4. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 1, at 1.
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obligations (CDOs) 5 was actively taking an adverse interest in the
portfolio. 6
This highly publicized case quickly drew the public's attention and
ire.7 Goldman, whether justly or not, had come to embody all that
was wrong with Wall Street in the American public's collective con-
scious. 8 The firm and its executives profited handsomely9 as most
Americans struggled through the worst economic collapse since World
War II.Io Recent homebuyers, previously fueled by cheap credit,
faced foreclosures at a dizzying rate." Unemployment figures surged
past historical averages.12 Complex, exotic financial instruments simi-
lar to those involved in the dispute between Goldman and the SEC
were at the center of this economic whirlwind.13
Upon announcing the Goldman settlement, Robert Khuzami, the
SEC's director of enforcement, proudly stated that the agreement
5. A CDO is a type of derivative defined as "[a] structured finance instrument consisting of a
bond or note backed by a pool of fixed-income assets." A DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND BANK-
ING 86 (4th ed. 2008). A single CDO is typically comprised of several tranches, or classes, each
with different risks and rights to the cash flow generated by the underlying pool of assets. See id.
These underlying assets can include pools of mortgages, business loans, corporate bonds, or
other derivative instruments. Raquel M. Gaspar & Thorsten Schmidt, On the Pricing of Collat-
eralized Debt Obligations, in THE CREDIT DERIVATIVES HANDBOOK 229, 233 (Greg N.
Gregoriou & Paul U. Ali eds., 2008).
6. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 1, at 2.
7. See Alan Abelson, Wanna Bet?, BARRON's, Apr. 26, 2010, at 7, 7.
8. See Stephen Davis & Jon Lukomnik, Real Story Behind Proxy Access Success, COMPLIANCE
WK., Aug. 2010, at 50, 50.
9. See Graham Bowley & Zachery Kouwe, With Bated Breath, Rivals Await Blankfein's Bo-
nus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at B1 (stating that Goldman set a company record for earnings in
2009). Goldman's CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, received compensation valued at $42.9 million in 2008
and a $9 million stock bonus in 2009. Goldman CEO Gets $9-Million All-Stock Bonus, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at B4.
10. E.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, at xii (2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf ("[G]lobal activity is projected to
contract by 1.3 percent in 2009. This represents the deepest post-World War II recession by
far."); Bradley D. Riel & Paul T. Meiklejohn, A Correlation Between the State of the US Econ-
omy and Patent Litigation Activity, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 71, 73 (2010); David
Wessel, A Big, Bad. . . 'Great' Recession?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2010, at A2.
11. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Subprime Resurfaces as Housing-Market Woe, WALL ST. J., July
9, 2009, at C1.
12. See Lisa Lambert, Jobless Rates in U.S. Cities Zoom Higher in April, REUTERS (June 3,
2009, 4:16 PM), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2009/06/03/us-usa-economy-unemployment-cities-
idUSTRE5526M520090603.
13. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xxv (2011), avail-
able at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]. In its final report, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission stated that over-the-counter (OTC) derivative instruments
such as credit default swaps and CDOs "lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis." Id. at
xxiii. The use of these instruments created an opaque interconnectedness between "systemically
important financial institutions," bringing about "cascading losses throughout the global finan-
cial system." Id. at xxv.
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served to remind "Wall Street firms that they must deal fairly with
clients, even if the product is complex or the investor sophisticated." 1 4
This proclamation echoes statements made by other prominent figures
in the securities industry.' 5
Admittedly, the assertions of Khuzami and others are correct. The
U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that determinations regard-
ing the materiality of a statement or omission are governed by a sin-
gle, objective test: the "reasonable investor" standard.16 Still, these
comments seem to sidestep a more fundamental issue: Who is the rea-
sonable investor? More specifically, do the expectations of, and de-
mands placed on, this hypothetical investor change with his abilities
and financial sophistication?
This Comment responds in the affirmative, at least with respect to
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives transactions.' 7 OTC derivatives
markets are vastly different from the financial markets in existence
during the drafting of the federal securities laws,' 8 and these differ-
ences necessitate a change in the judiciary's approach to materiality.
Allowing consideration of subjective factors would afford legal pro-
tection to those who need it while precluding imprudent OTC deriva-
tives investors from using the Securities Acts as an insurance policy
against their foolhardy decisions.' 9 It would also align the judiciary's
ex post analysis with that conducted ex ante by the contracting parties
prior to entering into a transaction, creating stronger precedents for
14. Craig & Scannell, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-
Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 47, 57 (2011) (referencing "[t]he SEC's long-standing implicit
recognition of broker-dealer fiduciary duties").
16. E.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
17. The term "derivative" covers a wide range of investment vehicles, but generally refers to
"a financial instrument with a payoff structure determined by the value of an underlying secur-
ity, commodity, interest rate, or index." FRED D. ARDrfTI, DERIVATIVES, at xiii (1996). Exam-
ples include futures, forward contracts, swaps, and options. BRIAN A. EALES & MOORAD
CHOUDHRY, DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 1 (2003). These investment vehicles allow investors to
trade in some risk relating to the performance of a reference asset, a market price, or any other
economic or natural phenomenon, often creating a completely independent trade in the refer-
ence asset's risks or returns. VINOD KO-THARI, CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND STRuCTURED CREDIT
TRADING 5 (rev. ed. 2009). The CDO involved in the Goldman dispute falls within this
definition.
18. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xvi ("The financial system we examined bears little
resemblance to that of our parents' generation."): Adam R. Waldman, Comment, OTC Deriva-
tives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 Am. U. L. REV. 1023,
1025 (1994) (stating that OTC derivatives have "radically altered the landscape of the global
capital markets").
19. See infra notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
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later courts and investors to follow. 2 0 As a result of these benefits, the
inclusion of a subjective component in materiality determinations
would more faithfully uphold the principles inherent in the federal
regulatory framework.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part II provides background
information regarding OTC derivatives markets and the regulatory
framework governing securities markets more generally.21 It exam-
ines the law as it currently stands, as well as its development, in an
effort to elucidate the values underlying the current regime. Part III
begins with a critique of the current objective standard of materiality
and explores the issues that have arisen in the course of its applica-
tion. 22 It then advocates for the inclusion of a subjective component
that accounts for the sophistication and capabilities of the parties to
OTC derivatives transactions. 23 Part IV applies the proposed stan-
dard, highlighting the benefits and drawbacks of a subjective stan-
dard.24 A brief conclusion follows in Part V.
II. BACKGROUND
The derivatives market in which the Goldman dispute arose bears
little resemblance to the traditional stock markets of the 1930s. In
fact, OTC derivatives markets have little in common with the modern-
day exchanges so often featured in the press. 2 5 Unlike exchanges,
OTC derivatives markets have no location and require no formal
membership. 26 Historically, this broad segment of the market has
been largely unregulated. 27 The SEC and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission could influence the OTC derivatives markets
only indirectly, either by using "their power over the registered deal-
ers and brokers" that also participate in the securities and futures
markets or through regulating exchange-traded derivatives. 28 A few
large financial institutions dominate these markets, and the majority
20. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 25-168 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 169-208 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 209-35 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 236-53 and accompanying text.
25. ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILD BEAST OF FINANCE 213 (1998).
26. Id.
27. Id. Although its effects are still being debated, the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act
certainly changes this. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (enacted).
28. Id. at 227; see also Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement at Treasury Department
Press Briefing on OTC Derivatives (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2009/spch051309mls.htm.
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of transactions involve a handful of firms.29 Participants in OTC
transactions conduct bilateral negotiations, and the resultant contracts
"are essentially private transactions."o
The nebulous structure of OTC derivatives markets creates differ-
ent opportunities and risks than those of traditional exchanges. There
is no "standardized" OTC derivative instrument; financial institutions
tailor contracts to the needs of the given investor.31 The complexity
spawned by such customization provides investors with the flexibility
to manage many of the risks they face, but also imposes significant
counterparty risk because there is no centralized clearinghouse back-
ing the transactions. 32 This counterparty risk is both compounded and
masked by the dearth of reliable information concerning market activ-
ity.3 3 Despite the sparse, "sketchy" information available, it is undis-
puted that OTC derivatives markets have grown at a prolific pace.34
This growth has dramatically altered the structure of the financial
markets and capitalism as a whole.35
Even with the tectonic shift in the financial markets' structure, the
regulatory framework has undergone little change. 36 The remainder
of this Part examines that framework, focusing primarily on three
components: (1) federal statutes, (2) administrative rules, and (3) rele-
vant case law. Examination of these individual pieces will both pro-
vide an understanding of the overarching structure of the current
regime and elicit insights into the framework's philosophical under-
pinnings. But before looking at the substance of this regulatory
framework, it is beneficial to look first at the historical context in
29. See STEINHERR, supra note 25, at 219-21.
30. Peter A. Abken, Over-the-Counter Financial Derivatives: Risky Business?, in PRACTICAL
READINGS IN FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 325, 326 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1998).
31. See id. at 325-26.
32. See id. at 332. Counterparty risk is "[t]he credit risk assumed when undertaking a transac-
tion with another party that they will be unable or unwilling to honour their commitments."
PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE TERMS 117
(1997). Counterparty risk is often a primary concern in OTC derivatives transactions, given the
long duration and unsecured nature of many of these transactions. Waldman, supra note 18, at
1049.
33. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 13, at xx-xxi.
34. See Abken, supra note 30, at 328 chart 1 (containing information regarding "worldwide
growth in notional principal for interest rate and currency swaps from 1987 to 1992").
35. See EDWARD LIPUMA & BENJAMIN LEE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES AND THE GLOBALIZA-
TION OF RISK 161-62 (2004); see also Waldman, supra note 18, at 1025 (noting that OTC deriva-
tives markets have "radically altered the landscape of the global capital markets").
36. See Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 1, 10; see also LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWs 2
(2d ed. 1990) (stating that the original draft of the 1933 Act "still constitutes the main body of
the Securities Act"). But see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (enacted).
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which it developed for guidance as to the identity of the reasonable
investor.
A. The Federal Securities Framework
Federal securities regulation emerged after a period of unprece-
dented economic distress.37 The nation was attempting to recover
from the stock market crash of 1929 and struggling through the Great
Depression.38 Before the crash's onset, securities were regulated by
state statutes-so-called "blue sky laws." 39 Under this regime, each
state legislature enacted its own laws governing the issuance and trad-
ing of securities within its jurisdiction.40 The resulting patchwork of
statutes varied not only in the classes of activities regulated, but also
in the treatment of the targeted activities. 41 Leading up to the stock
market crash, the capital markets experienced a "surge of securities
activity," particularly by individuals "[t]empted by promises of 'rags to
riches' transformations and easy credit." 42 Many throughout the
country blamed the subsequent fall in stock prices on these specula-
tors' inattention to risk and on swindlers perpetrating frauds upon un-
witting investors.43 The market's precipitous drop served as proof of
the states' inability to address the challenges of the then-modern se-
curities industry on their own; the increasingly interstate nature of
business and the states' limited resources undermined the efficacy of
state-based regulation during difficult economic times. 44 Soon after
the crash, the call for federal action was sounded. 45
While the crash of 1929 crystallized the need for federal inter-
vention, federal legislators were split as to the appropriate course of
37. See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited
July 9, 2011) [hereinafter Investor's Advocate].
38. Id.
39. See Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 9-10
(5th ed. 2004). Generally, states adopted one of two types of blue sky laws. See HOMER V.
CHERRINGTON, THE INVESTOR AND THE SECURITIES AcT 51 (1942). The first, and less popular,
type was antifraud laws. States using this approach "refuse[d] to interfere with the flotation of
any securities unless it ... appear[ed] that fraud ha[d] been or [was] about to be committed." Id.
The second, more restrictive type, called regulatory laws, allowed securities "to be sold in intra-
state commerce only when there has been definite compliance with [the] law." Id. at 52.
40. CHERRINGTON, supra note 39, at 51-52.
41. See id. at 52.
42. Investor's Advocate, supra note 37.
43. See Kathleen Ambrose Lee, Note, CBI Industries, Inc. v. Horton: The Seventh Circuit Lets
the Insider Off, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 247, 248-49 (1983).
44. Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 56-57 (1951).
45. See SODERQUIST, supra note 36, at 1 ("[The Securities Act] grew out of the 1929 market
crash and Franklin Roosevelt's 1932 campaign .... ).
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action.46 Two dominant perspectives emerged: a direct, merit-based
approach and an indirect, disclosure-based approach.47
The direct approach, championed by William 0. Douglas, would
operate similarly to most states' blue sky laws.4 8 Under this approach
government officials possess the authority to prevent companies from
issuing public offerings that they deem "unfair, unjust, inequitable or
oppressive." 49 Proponents of this approach argued that mere disclo-
sure would "fall[ ] far short of accomplishing its purposes"50 because
investors would "either lack the training or intelligence to . .. find [the
disclosed information] useful" or be so concerned with "speculative
profit" that they would consider the information "irrelevant."51 These
proponents also harbored concerns over the disparate burdens that a
duty to disclose would impose. 52 In their view, well-established corpo-
rations with widespread, diverse business operations would face
greater difficulty in disclosing information than smaller, less estab-
lished companies, which were more apt to swindle investors.53
Despite these criticisms, a disclosure-based approach garnered sig-
nificant support. 54 Under this approach, government officials make
no judgment as to the merits of a given security.55 The government's
role is only to ensure that the issuer has provided the statutorily re-
quired information, thereby providing potential investors with an ade-
quate basis from which to make an informed investment decision.56
Advocates lauded the disclosure-based system for its ability to dis-
suade businesses from undertaking dishonest practices previously con-
46. Loss, supra note 44, at 76.
47. See id. at 76-77.
48. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities and
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 82
(2005).
49. E.g., Act of Mar. 10, 1911, ch. 133, § 5, 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210, 212, repealed by Act of
Mar. 16, 1929, ch. 140, 1929 Kan. Sess. Laws 212.
50. Loss, supra note 44, at 78.
51. Id. at 79 (quoting William o. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (N.S.) 521,
523-24 (1934)).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 38-39.
55. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 276-77 (1991); Loss, supra note 44, at 36; Rick A. Fleming, 100 Years of
Securities Law: Examining a Foundation Laid in the Kansas Blue Sky, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 583,
602-03 (2011).
56. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("The Securities Act of 1933
was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public
offerings of securities in commerce . . . ." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)): see also 15
U.S.C. § 77g (2006) (stating the information required in a security's registration statement); 15
U.S.C. § 781 (stating the registration requirement for securities).
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ducted away from the view of watchful eyes.57 As Justice Brandeis
famously quipped, "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants." 58
At the same time, proponents viewed the approach as "a minimalist
form of government intervention" because investors retain the auton-
omy to determine how best to improve their position and are free to
invest as they wished, no matter how foolish or improvident their de-
cisions ultimately prove.59
From these chief benefits would flow several corollaries. Propo-
nents expected the additional information required under a disclosure
regime to level the playing field between investors and companies is-
suing securities.60 This, in turn, was expected to instill investor confi-
dence in the markets.61 Armed with additional information regarding
business' prospects, investors would no longer need to rely on rumors
or speculation to make investment decisions.62 Advocates of a
disclosure-based approach therefore believed that transactions would
better reflect the sum of information known regarding a security,
which would also reduce the volatility of securities prices. 63
Hence, a disclosure-based system addressed the chief contributors
of the 1929 crash and ultimately carried the day. The disclosure re-
gime resulted in fairer, more efficient, and more stable capital mar-
kets.64 Companies raising capital through the markets shared in these
benefits.65 The reciprocal benefits provided by a disclosure philoso-
phy are captured in an SEC statement made in the course of one of its
enforcement actions:
The importance of accurate and complete issuer disclosure to the
integrity of the securities markets cannot be overemphasized. To
the extent that investors cannot rely upon the accuracy and com-
pleteness of issuer statements, they will be less likely to invest,
57. E.g., Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: To-
ward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 139, 151 (2006).
58. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (2d ed.
1914).
59. Ripken, supra note 57, at 155.
60. Id. at 153.
61. Id. at 154; see also Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell, or Hold? Analyst Fraud from Economic
and Natural Law Perspectives, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 120 (2007) ("Only upon such a restoration
[of 'the ancient truths'], Roosevelt argued, could investor confidence, and thus capital markets,
be resuscitated.").
62. Ripken, supra note 57, at 154.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 55, at 288 (stating that firms would voluntarily
disclose information-to the benefit of both themselves and investors-in order to fund profit-
able projects in the absence of mandatory disclosure requirements).
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thereby reducing the liquidity of the securities markets to the detri-
ment of investors and issuers alike.66
Congress has incorporated disclosure requirements into many of
the federal securities laws, including more recent legislation, 6 7 and the
disclosure paradigm has become a keystone of U.S. securities regula-
tion.68 Due to materiality's prominent position within this framework,
the concept has far-reaching effects for both publicly traded corpora-
tions and investors alike.
1. The Securities Acts
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) marked the federal legisla-
ture's first attempt to regulate the securities markets;69 Congress re-
visited its governance of the markets the following year with the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).70 The Acts complement
one another and can be viewed as interrelated, interdependent com-
ponents of a single regulatory scheme.71  The 1933 Act governs the
primary markets in which shares of securities are initially issued, gen-
erally requiring issuers to file a registration statement containing basic
information regarding the company and the securities. 7 2 The 1934
Act, on the other hand, focuses on the secondary markets where in-
vestors buy and sell those previously issued securities,73 generally im-
66. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, 33 SEC Docket 874, 877 (July 8,
1985); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 235 n.12 (1988) (acknowledging the SEC's
position).
67. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1023, 1023 (2000). The use of disclosure as a means to protect investors against fraud and
manipulation can be seen in, for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
68. Bainbridge, supra note 67, at 1023; R. Daniel Keleman & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americani-
zation of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 269, 285 (2002); Janis Sarra, Rose-Colored
Glasses, Opaque Financial Reporting, and Investor Blues: Enron as Con and the Vulnerability of
Canadian Corporate Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 715, 741 (2002).
69. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77a).
70. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78a).
71. E.g., SODEROUIST, supra note 36, at 3 (referring to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as
"the second part of the securities regulatory scheme that was contemplated as early as the 1932
Democratic campaign"); C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court's
Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, FORDHAM L. REV., Oct. 1990, at 39, 41; see also
SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969) ("The fact that there may well be some overlap
[between the 1933 and 1934 Acts] is neither unusual nor unfortunate.").
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006) (prohibiting sale or delivery of unregistered securities).
73. James C. Sargent, The Development of Rule 10b-5, in EMERGING FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW: POTENTIAL LIABILITY 1, 2 (Virginia Davis Nordin ed., 1969).
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posing ongoing duties to report relevant information. 74 Thus, the 1934
Act ensures that certain standards of fairness are maintained in securi-
ties markets after the shares are initially issued in accordance with the
1933 Act. Unsurprisingly, the Acts share many of the same themes,
including a fundamental concern with the efficiency and fairness of
the markets.75
2. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
While the 1933 Act marked a dramatic departure from the previous
regulatory scheme, § 17 of the Act was particularly notable.76 As "the
grandfather of all the SEC fraud provisions,"77  17 broke ground as
the first fraud provision "specifically tailored to the securities field."7 8
The section takes an expansive view of fraud, referring both to out-
right fraud as well as "material misstatements and half truths." 7 9 Its
reach extends beyond that of the state-enacted blue sky laws, which
focused solely "on the direct relationship between specific buyers and
sellers of securities," and instead seeks to address the general impact
that securities fraud has on investor confidence and the market as a
whole.80
Congress pushed a step further by enacting § 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
which empowers the SEC to prohibit and punish manipulative acts
not explicitly mentioned in § 17 of the 1933 Act. 1 Section § 10(b),
considered a "catchall" provision,8 2 was designed to protect investors
and promote the integrity of the securities markets by preventing
fraud, manipulation, and deception in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security.83 As the Supreme Court opined, "[I]t is hard to
imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on mar-
74. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (stating the periodic reporting requirements for issuers of securities);
id. § 781 (stating the registration requirements of parties effecting security transactions on a na-
tional securities exchange).
75. Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REv. 570, 572 (2008).
76. See Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 17, 48 Stat. 84, 84-85 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77q).
77. Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 902 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 903. Prior to the enactment of the 1933 Act and § 17, the sole basis for federal
prosecution was violation of the mail fraud statute. Id. at 901.
79. Id. at 903.
80. Id. at 919.
81. See Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j).
82. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-03 (1976) (discussing Stock Exchange
Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) (statement of Mr. Thomas Gardner Corcoran, Counsel with
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Washington, D.C.)).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
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ket integrity." 8 4 To accomplish the goals of § 10(b), the SEC has em-
ployed the provision as the "primary . . . mechanism for regulating
securities fraud."85
Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any se-
curity not so registered, . .. any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.86
3. The Securities Exchange Commission and Rule 10b-5
The 1933 Act established a new statutory framework but left Con-
gress needing a mechanism to enforce the new provisions. Congress
first called upon the Federal Trade Commission to fulfill this role. 7
But in light of the enactment of the 1934 Act-and the additional ad-
ministrative burdens it entailed-Congress authorized the creation of
the SEC.88
The SEC has since sought to "to protect investors, maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation."8 9
These interrelated goals often form a symbiotic relationship, 90 yet at
times such broad objectives conflict with one another.91 It is therefore
incumbent on the SEC to strike a delicate balance between these
sometimes-competing interests.
The 1934 Act authorizes the SEC to develop and implement rules
"as necessary or appropriate in the public interest." 92 Pursuant to this
statutory authority, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it
84. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys.
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
85. Steinbuch, supra note 75, at 572.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
87. Michael H. Dessent, Joe Six-Pack, United States v. O'Hagan, and Private Securities Liti-
gation Reform: A Line Must Be Drawn, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1137, 1145 (1998).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a); see also Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 39, at 67.
89. Investor's Advocate, supra note 37.
90. Laura Simone Unger, View from the SEC-Promoting Fair and Efficient Markets as a
Regulatory End, in REGULATION OF U.S. EouIrY MARKETs 59, 60 (Robert A. Schwartz ed.,
2001) ("[I]nvestors are important to the market and the market is important to investors.").
91. Id. ("[T]oo much regulation may . . . overly protect investors to the detriment of the
marketplace.").
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a).
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unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading." 93
Rule 10b-5 was a direct response to the perceived inequity caused
by a loophole within § 17 of the 1933 Act.9 4 Consequently, the Rule
borrows much of its language from § 17,95 and courts have consist-
ently interpreted the two provisions similarly. 96 Rule 10b-5 has there-
fore taken an expansive view of fraud, and courts have applied the
Rule to a wide variety of conduct.97 As the Court concluded in Super-
intendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., the Rule "pro-
hibit[s] all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type va-
riety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception."98
Given its breadth, the staggering quantity of litigation generated by
Rule 10b-5 is unsurprising. Litigation under the Rule has increased
since the Court first permitted investors, rather than the SEC, sue de-
fendants directly.99 The contours of this implied right of action have
waxed and waned over time. Once referred to as "a judicial oak
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
94. In the course of one of its investigations, SEC staff members, looking to the language of
the 1933 Act, interpreted § 17 as imposing disclosure duties upon only the seller. Sargent, supra
note 73, at 4. Prompted by this inequity, the SEC put forth Rule 10b-5, thereby imposing disclo-
sure duties on both parties. Id. The Commissioners quickly approved the Rule. The "debate"
over the Rule consisted of Sumner Pike's single comment, "[W]e are against fraud aren't we?"
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967) (state-
ment of Milton V. Freeman).
95. Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45
AM. Bus. L.J. 611, 621 (2008); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
96. See SEC v. Shanahan, 646 F.3d 536, 541 (8th Cir. 2011); SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249,
1256 (10th Cir. 2008). But see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (holding that scienter is not
required to prove a violation under § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (rejecting a private right of action for violations of § 17(a) of
the 1934 Act).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986) (involving the misappro-
priation of insider information); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981)
(involving unlawful manipulative practices in connection with a tender offer); Schlick v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974) (involving claims arising in connection with a
merger).
98. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 n.7 (1971) (emphasis
added) (quoting A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393. 397 (2d Cir. 1967)).
99. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982) (noting
"the increased volume of federal litigation" as a factor in its decision to adopt heightened stan-
dards for implying private rights of action); Bhavik R. Patel, Note, Rule 10b-5 No Longer Scares
the Judiciary, but May Scare Corporate Defendants: The United States Supreme Court Switches
Directions, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 191, 206 (2002) (discussing the impact of "the
increased incidence of securities fraud litigation" arising under Rule 10b-5).
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which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn," 1= more
recent Supreme Court decisions have whittled away at the breadth of
Rule lOb-5's implied private right of action. 101
Generally, plaintiffs-whether the SEC or individual investors-
must prove six elements to prevail under Rule 10b-5: (1) a material
misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance on the material misrepre-
sentation or omission, also known as transaction causation; (5) eco-
nomic loss; and (6) loss causation.102
B. Materiality Defined
While each element of a Rule 10b-5 claim raises complex issues, the
requirement that a misstatement or omission be material has proved
particularly troublesome. At its core, the concept of materiality is a
simple one.103 Despite its theoretical simplicity, however, courts and
practitioners have found the concept "slippery" and "elusive" when
put into practice. 104 The numerous attempts by courts and regulators
to fashion a practical test or working definition have largely failed.
The following discussion outlines the most prominent of those at-
tempts and describes the resulting confusion.
1. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.
The seminal case regarding the concept of materiality in securities
regulation is TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.105 Northway, a
corporation holding shares in TSC Industries, alleged that TSC's
proxy statement failed to adequately state the degree of an acquiring
company's control over TSC and the favorability of the terms of a
proposed merger.106 Northway claimed that its interests were effec-
100. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
101. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008)
(holding that § 10(b)'s implied right of action does not extend to aiders and abettors); see also
W. Taylor Marshall, Note, 'Round and 'Round We Go: The Supreme Court Again Limits the
Circumstances in Which Federal Courts May Hold Secondary Actors Liable Under Section 10(B)
and SEC Rule 1OB-5, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 197, 198 (2008) ("Beginning with the
Rehnquist Court in 1972, the Supreme Court has systematically narrowed the reach of liability
under section 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5.").
102. E.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011); Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 157; Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
103. Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 62 Bus. LAW. 317, 319 (2007).
104. Id. (citing SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977)).
105. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
106. Id. at 441.
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tively liquidated, and it filed suit under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act and its
correlative regulations.10 7
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of TSC, finding none of the omis-
sions to be misleading as a matter of law. 10s In doing so, the Court
unanimously recognized the issue of materiality "as a mixed question
of law and fact" 109 that turns on the importance a reasonable person
would attach to the misrepresented or omitted fact"o The more diffi-
cult issue concerned the proper threshold for determining when a
statement or omission became sufficiently material to allow for liabil-
ity.111 The Court concluded that information becomes sufficiently ma-
terial only when, under all the circumstances, its disclosure would
raise a "substantial likelihood" that "the omitted fact would have as-
sumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable share-
holder" or "would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the total mix of information made
available."1 12
The Court reached its conclusion "in view of the prophylactic pur-
pose" of the rule at issue, 113 focusing on the role materiality plays as
"a critical gatekeeper"1 4 in filtering out irrelevant information in the
decision process.'15 The Court drew a sharp distinction between the
quantity and quality of information disclosed,116 noting the potential
for corporations to avoid liability by "bury[ing] the shareholders in an
107. Id. The regulations require proxy solicitations to include disclosure of all material facts
and prohibit false or misleading statements regarding any material fact. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3
(2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2011).
108. TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 452-53.
109. Id. at 450.
110. Id. at 445.
111. See id. at 445. The Court noted that there was universal agreement that an objective view
of materiality is required. Id. However, lower courts had reached differing conclusions regard-
ing the proper threshold for determining materiality. Compare List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) ("The basic test of 'materiality,' on the other hand, is whether a
reasonable man would attach importance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice
of action in the transaction in question." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)), with Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that the
proper test of materiality "includes all facts which a reasonable shareholder might consider im-
portant" (emphasis added)).
112. TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at 448.
114. Glenn F. Miller, Comment, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99: Another Ill-Advised Foray
into the Murky World of Qualitative Materiality, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 361, 368 (2000); see also
Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of "Materiality" Under U.S. Federal Securities
Laws, 40 WILLAMErE L. REV. 661, 662 (2004).
115. Miller, supra note 114, at 368; see also TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 448-49.
116. See TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 448.
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avalanche of trivial information-a result that is hardly conducive to
informed decisionmaking."11 7
After setting the threshold, the Court went on to stress the fact-
specific nature of the inquiry and explained that the underlying facts
are often only the beginning of the analysis.118 It noted that disputes
may often hinge upon the inferences that a reasonable shareholder
might draw from those facts and that the "delicate assessments" of
inferences are best left to the trier of fact. 119
2. Basic Inc. v. Levinson
The Supreme Court revisited the concept of materiality in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson, this time in the context of preliminary merger dis-
cussions.120 The plaintiffs alleged that Basic's management publicly
denied participating in ongoing merger discussions while actively tak-
ing part in such negotiations. 121 The plaintiffs sold their shares after
the management's denials but before the announcement of the even-
tual merger. 122 They then filed a class action suit under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 to recover damages resulting from the lower prices they
received from their sales.123
The Supreme Court's ensuing analysis focused on two issues. First,
it explicitly extended the TSC Industries standard of materiality to
fraud suits filed under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.124 Keeping in line with
that decision, the Court again emphasized the fact-sensitive nature of
materiality determinations.12 5 Carrying this logic forward, the Court
reasoned that designating a single fact as determinative "must neces-
sarily be overinclusive or underinclusive."126 It therefore eschewed
the bright-line rule urged by Basic's counsel and held that materiality
determinations must be made "in the light of all the circumstances."1 27
While the Court recognized the difficulties of conducting such an all-
117. Id. at 448-49
118. Id. at 450.
119. Id.
120. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The forward-looking, speculative nature of
mergers complicates the analysis of a statement's materiality. See id. at 232. These finer points
of materiality fall beyond the scope of this Comment.
121. Id. at 227-28.
122. Id. at 228.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 232 ("We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 context.").
125. Id. at 240.
126. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 236.
127. Id. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this approach in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, rejecting the defendant's contention that reports of adverse events associated with a
pharmaceutical company's products are material only when provided in sufficient number to
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encompassing analysis, it nevertheless stated that "ease of application
alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts
and Congress' policy decisions. "128
Second, the Supreme Court upheld the rebuttable presumption of
reliance supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.129 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on practical considerations,
such as the nature of then-modern securities markets,130 the unique
difficulties of proving reliance in nondisclosure cases, 131 judicial econ-
omy, 132 and common sense.' 33  Once invoked, the presumption
removes the plaintiff's burden to establish actual reliance and places
the burden on the defendant to present evidence affirmatively over-
coming the presumption to avoid liability.134
3. Later Interpretations of Materiality
The apparent simplicity of these landmark cases masks the com-
plexities lurking beneath the surface.13 5 As a result, both scholars and
practitioners have scorned the cases not so much for what they said,
but for what they did not. 136 Case law after Basic has embraced con-
raise a "statistically significant" risk that the product is causing the adverse events. 131 S. Ct.
1309, 1313-14 (2011).
128. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 236.
129. Id. at 247. The fraud-on-the-market theory posits:
A purchaser on the stock exchanges .. .. relies generally on the supposition that the
market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated
the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the stock
price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays reflects material
misrepresentations.
E.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). Other federal appellate courts ac-
cepted the fraud-on-the-market theory prior to the Supreme Court's Basic Inc. decision. See,
e.g., T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th
Cir. 1983); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1981); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th
Cir. 1981).
130. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 243-44.
131. See id. at 245.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 246.
134. See id. at 248. A defendant can still overcome the presumption of reliance by showing
that (1) the misrepresentation was immaterial; (2) the market was aware of the misrepresenta-
tion's falsity; (3) the misrepresentation was not assimilated into the security's market price; (4)
the plaintiff would have still traded in the securities at the same price with full knowledge of the
misrepresentation; (5) the plaintiff traded the securities with the actual belief that the market
price was inaccurate; or (6) the plaintiff's decision to trade the securities was not based on the
market price. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 179 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000).
135. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call
for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 1131, 1138 (2003).
136. E.g., Steven E. Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The Duty to Update and Disclosure Reform:
The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure Initiatives, 7 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 225,
228 (2002) ("Using a reasonable investor test, it is difficult to pinpoint the moment when less
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flicting views of materiality. Court determinations have been unpre-
dictable, leaving many to argue that they are based on "subjective
conjecture" rather than objective facts. 137
a. Interaction Between Rule 10b-5's Elements
Part of the confusion stems from the interplay between the ele-
ments of claims arising under Rule 10b-5. Particularly relevant is the
interaction between the defendant's duty to disclose (materiality) and
the plaintiff's duty to make use of that disclosure. These are, to be
sure, distinct elements that implicate different policy considerations;
however, some courts have interpreted the two elements in con-
junction with one another.138
Of particular interest is the courts' treatment of reliance, which
"provides the requisite causal connection between a defendant's mis-
representation and a plaintiff's injury." 139 Most jurisdictions seek to
determine whether a plaintiff's reliance on a misstatement was "rea-
sonable" 140 or "justifiable." 1 4 1 A plaintiff's carelessness must typically
rise to a level constituting "recklessness" to fail this test.142 Similar to
materiality, reasonable-reliance determinations must "be made on a
case-by-case basis based on all of the surrounding circumstances." 1 4 3
Courts have offered a number of relevant factors to consider when
making these determinations, but unlike materiality determinations,
significant pieces of information received over the course of the quarter become material in the
aggregate."); John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an
Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 44-45 (1998) ("Even with the benefit of the
definition [of materiality provided in TSC Industries], disclosure decisions are arduous.").
137. E.g., Sauer, supra note 103, at 319.
138. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The
crux of materiality is whether, in context, an investor would reasonably rely on the defendant's
statement as one reflecting a consequential fact about the company."), vacated on other grounds,
551 U.S. 308 (2007), remanded to 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (noting the disagreement and confusion "concerning the meaning and
applicability of 'reliance' and 'materiality"'). For an interesting analysis of this interplay, see
Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities Regulation, 61
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143 (2010).
139. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 243.
140. See, e.g., AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 2003) ("The 'reason-
able reliance' element of a Rule lOb-5 claim requires . . . a demonstration that the plaintiff
exercised the diligence that a reasonable person under all of the circumstances would have exer-
cised to protect his own interests.").
141. See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993); Zobrist v.
Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983).
142. See Brown, 991 F.2d at 1032.
143. AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 179.
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the plaintiff's financial sophistication and expertise is almost always
included.144
However, not all jurisdictions follow this majority rule. For exam-
ple, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has-in at least
one situation-disavowed justifiable reliance as an independent ele-
ment of a Rule 10b-5 claim, viewing it instead as "no more than the
combination of a material misstatement (or omission) and causa-
tion." 145 This approach appears to take a much more subjective view
of reliance than the majority's reasonable-reliance rubric, and it pre-
cludes recovery when "the investor knows enough so that the lie or
omission still leaves him cognizant of the risk." 146
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit takes yet a different
tack. Concerned with consistency in application, it has established a
separate "due diligence" element for private Rule 10b-5 actions that
explicitly adopts a subjective lens.147 Under this approach, a plaintiff's
conduct is evaluated for recklessness using a reasonable investor with
the plaintiff's attributes as the benchmark. 148 Although these diver-
gent perspectives suggest that the issue of reliance may be as fractious
as materiality, virtually all jurisdictions-even those taking an objec-
tive view of reliance-account for a plaintiff's resources and
sophistication.
b. Interaction Between Elements and Evidence
Also adding to the confusion over the proper conception of materi-
ality are issues regarding the type of evidence required to prove a
Rule lOb-5 violation. The proof required to establish an element of
an alleged violation is generally distinct from the element's definition,
yet these two concepts have seemingly blurred in some instances.149
Justice Alito, then-judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, stated that "the concept of materiality translates into informa-
tion that alters the price of the firm's stock."150 For this reason, courts
144. E.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex, Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1028 (4th Cir. 1997);
Brown, 991 F.2d at 1032; Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 918 (6th Cir.
1991); Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1516.
145. Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1546 (7th Cir.
1990).
146. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530 (7th Cir. 1985).
147. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir. 1977).
148. Id.
149. See Herman v. T & S Commodities, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1406, 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (hold-
ing that a piece of information was material because of the market reaction elicited by its
disclosure).
150. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1977)). Like the fraud-on-the-market theory employed
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and litigants have looked to the market's reaction as persuasive evi-
dence of the materiality of a given piece of information.'5 1
This objective approach looks beyond the litigants at bar and con-
siders the view of the market as a whole. Given the dominant role of
institutional investors in modern securities markets,152 some might ar-
gue that the objective approach necessarily incorporates the views of
sophisticated investors. In many circumstances, however, this tech-
nique is unavailing due to practical difficulties that may preclude its
use.15 3 Courts have therefore relied on other presumptions and pro-
cedural tools to supplement their analyses. 154 Often times, these tools
have provided conflicting guidance without articulating a coherent le-
gal principle to distinguish cases or their treatment.
For example, in SEC v. Shapiro, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held undisclosed information to be material because
the defendant, a financially sophisticated investor accused of illegally
trading on inside information, invested soon after receiving the alleg-
edly material information.155 In another case, SEC v. Mayhew, the
Second Circuit stated that a major consideration in determining the
in Basic Inc., this conclusion is premised on the assumption that the price of a security in an
efficient market reflects all information important to a reasonable investor. See In re Burlington
Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1425. The Third Circuit adopted a strict interpretation of this theory,
holding that information could be deemed immaterial as a matter of law if its disclosure failed to
affect the market price of the security. See id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has taken a more relaxed view, holding that market reaction to the disclosure of information, as
evinced through changes in a security's price and trading volume, may be used as a factor for
consideration. See No. 84 Emp'r-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding
Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that, in addition to other factors, a slightly
delayed market reaction to a disclosure supports a finding of materiality).
151. See, e.g., Oran, 226 F.3d at 282.
152. See Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1961, 1963 (2010) (stating that "institutional investors held approximately fifty percent of
total U.S. corporate equities" in 2009 and "an unprecedented 76.4% of the largest 1000 corpor-
ations" in 2007); see also John C. Bogle, Individual Stockholder, R.I.P., WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005.
at A16 (stating that the 9% ownership stake of institutional investors in 1950 "now totals 68% of
all stocks").
153. See Sauer, supra note 103, at 324-25. Evidence of the market's reaction may be unavail-
able or difficult to interpret due to the timeliness or form of the disclosure. Id. at 324. Addition-
ally, the dynamics of the market may render it difficult or impossible to isolate the effect of the
relevant disclosure from the "background noise" of the market. Id. at 325. Furthermore, this
category of evidence is only available ex post and is therefore of no assistance in determining
whether or not to disclose information ex ante. Lee, supra note 115, at 664.
154. See, e.g., SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding materiality because of
the importance attached to the information by the defendant); SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301.
1307 (2d Cir. 1974) (same).
155. Shapiro, 494 F.2d at 1307 ("But we need not merely speculate as to how a reasonable
investor might have received this information. The behavior of appellant, his partner Shapiro,
and others who knew of the merger, all of whom were sophisticated investors, demonstrates
empirically that the information was material.").
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materiality of information "is the importance attached to it by those
who knew about it."156 While these notions may make intuitive sense,
seeking to uncover the defendant's interpretation of the information
through his actions adds a subjective aspect to materiality.
But not all cases consider such subjective factors; the Supreme
Court's acceptance of the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic Inc. is a
prime example.157 Prior to the rebuttable presumption of reliance
supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory, plaintiffs were forced to
prove actual, subjective reliance on the alleged misrepresentation or
omission.' 58 Acceptance of the fraud-on-the-market theory waives
this requirement.159 Thus, once a plaintiff raises the presumption of
reliance, both reliance and materiality become completely objective
inquiries.
c. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99
Perhaps sensing the confusion of judges, attorneys, and executives
across the nation,160 the SEC released Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
99 (SAB No. 99) in 1999.161 Despite only mimicking the standard ac-
counting and auditing procedures already prevalent at the time, 162 the
SEC's pronouncement has become critical to the analysis of qualita-
156. Mayhew, 121 F.3d at 52. Even this method is not a perfect guide to determine objective
materiality. For example, under the "mosaic theory," a relatively insignificant fact may become
material by way of the investor's extensive knowledge or familiarity with the security. See
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980).
157. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (upholding the presumption of reli-
ance supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory employed by the district court).
158. See Guerra v. Teradyne Inc., No. 01-11789-NG, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28548, at *13 n.3
(D. Mass. Jan. 16, 2004) ("There is no longer any requirement that 'reliance' be directly pleaded
in a 'fraud on the market' claim . . . ."); Rand v. Monsanto Co., No. 85 C 9087, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2936, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1989) ("It is no longer the law that a plaintiff must show
actual reliance on fraudulent statements in order to prevail under the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory . . . ."). Even before the Supreme Court accepted the presumption of reliance in Basic Inc.,
it had previously waived specific proof of reliance when there was an omission of a material fact
by one with a duty to disclose. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
153-54 (1972).
159. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 245.
160. Prior to the issuance of Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, courts were split as to the
propriety of using quantitative thresholds in determining the materiality of misstatements. Com-
pare SEC v. Hoover, 903 F. Supp. 1135, 1148 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding a misstatement of three
percent immaterial as a matter of law), with Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 633
(1st Cir. 1996) (considering the size of the misstatement in relation to the surrounding
circumstances).
161. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211) [hereinafter SAB No. 99].
162. See id. at 45,152 n.14 (stating that SAB No. 99 "is not intended to change current law or
guidance in the accounting literature").
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tive materiality.1 6 3 Similar to the Basic decision, it cautions against
exclusive reliance on quantitative measurements or bright-line tests
when making materiality determinations, even stating that potential
market reaction to a disclosure is "too blunt an instrument to be de-
pended on." 1 64 According to SAB No. 99, materiality is too nuanced
a concept to "be reduced to a numerical formula" and must "take into
account all the considerations that enter into an experienced human
judgment."16 5 A misstatement could have a larger impact on an inves-
tor's decision-making process than its quantitatively small size would
indicate because of qualitative factors not captured by numerical cal-
culations.16 6 For example, a relatively minor misstatement may mask
sales trends or conceal problems with loan covenants regarding a com-
pany's financial condition. 167 Finally, SAB No. 99 states that manage-
ment's intent does not necessarily make a statement material, but
"may provide significant evidence of [the statement's] materiality." 1 68
III. ANALYSIS
The tension in defining materiality highlights an area of the law that
remains, for lack of a better description, in a state of "disarray." 1 6 9
The reasoning and dispositions of cases have been inconsistent and
have failed to articulate a cohesive framework to analyze future cases.
Critics deride "objective" determinations of materiality as "exercise[s]
in subjective projection by the trier of fact."o7 0 This Comment advo-
cates for the consideration of the parties' sophistication in materiality
determinations in the OTC derivatives markets. This subjective ap-
proach would provide disclosing parties much-needed guidance re-
garding the disclosure of information and would provide courts with a
cogent framework for analyzing issues while supporting the goals of
the Securities Acts.
163. Sauer, supra note 103, at 336. Unlike quantitative materiality, which utilizes benchmarks
of assets, earnings, and liabilities, a qualitative standard of materiality measures disclosure deci-
sions based on amorphous factors such as quality, kind, essential character, or conduct. Fedders,
supra note 136, at 41.
164. SAB No. 99, supra note 161, at 45,152 (citing FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information 169 (1980)).
165. Id. at 45,151.
166. Id. at 45,152 ("Qualitative factors may cause misstatements of quantitatively small
amounts to be material.").
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988
DUKE L.J. 1081, 1133.
170. Sauer, supra note 103, at 321.
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This Part begins with a brief hypothetical that demonstrates the pit-
falls of a purely objective standard of materiality. It first examines a
key assumption underlying the objective standard, concluding that
such a justification is insufficient to preclude an inquiry of subjective
considerations. The second section analyzes the issues arising from
case law addressing the issue of materiality. The third section pro-
poses the inclusion of a subjective element in materiality determina-
tions arising from OTC derivatives transactions, allowing courts to
consider the financial sophistication and resources of the transacting
parties. This Part concludes by analogizing the proposed materiality
standard to trust law's "prudent investor" rule.
A. Materiality in Theory
Using materiality to delineate information that must be disclosed
from information that need not be disclosed is well reasoned and has a
firm basis in economics. 171 Distinguishing between material and non-
material information increases efficiency by reducing contracting par-
ties' transaction costs. 172 Assuming that an issuer is better positioned
to know its own general affairs and future prospects, requiring it to
disclose material information obviates the need for investors to incur
higher costs to obtain this information. 73 Furthermore, limiting the
disclosure requirement to only material information reduces the costs
to both the investor and the issuer.174 The investor saves the time and
cost of sifting through piles of inconsequential information; the issuer
avoids the costs of compiling or disseminating information of little or
no marginal benefit to investors.
An abstract conception of materiality, while sound in theory, can
pose problems when applied to concrete cases. The drawbacks of
such an approach may be best illustrated by the following example:
Consider two equity investors, one implementing a value-based in-
vestment strategy 75 and the other implementing a growth-oriented in-
171. But see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 55, at 280-83 (describing the likely func-
tioning of financial markets without disclosure requirements).
172. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976); cf RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 94 (7th ed. 2007) (stating that one of the main goals
of contract law is to obviate costly self-protective measures).
173. EASTERBROOK & FIsCHEL, supra note 55, at 290 ("Firms that promise to make disclo-
sures for [the purpose of reducing the cost of holding the stock] will prosper relative to others,
because their investors will incur relatively lower costs and can be more passive with safety.").
174. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Im-
perfect Paradigm of Rule lOb-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218, 1269-70 (1987) (discussing the
justifications for issuers' affirmative duty to disclose information).
175. Value investors generally seek to invest in "cheap" companies valued at a discount to
their true worth. See FRANK K. REILLY & KEITH C. BROWN. INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORT-
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vestment strategy.176 Because these investors use different criteria to
make investment decisions, one investor may legitimately assign
greater importance to a particular piece of information than the other
investor. This leaves open the possibility that one investor will deem
the information material, while the other does not. Assuming that
there can only be one standard of materiality, as the reasonable inves-
tor standard does, a court may be forced to determine which inves-
tor's assignment is correct. The strict objectivity of the reasonable
investor standard, however, is unresponsive to this dilemma. 177 Sim-
ply presuming both investors to be reasonable does not provide a
principled basis for reconciling the differences between these inves-
tors' viewpoints.178
B. Investors' Informational Needs
Fundamental to the reasonable investor standard's coherence is an
implicit assumption that all investors are identical-or should be
treated as such. As the Second Circuit stated in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., "Speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay Streets are also
'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded
conservative traders."179 Other courts have offered similar senti-
ments.8 0 This position seems rooted in the notion of fundamental
FOLIO MANAGEMENT 909 (6th ed. 2000). These investors place less emphasis on the economic
drivers of a company's earnings growth and hope to uncover stocks whose price will increase
with little change in earnings. Id. Attractive companies tend to be in the later stages of their life
cycle and are common in regulated industries. See JACK CLARK FRANCIS, MANAGEMENT OF
INVESTMENTS 572 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining the general arc of a company's life using the life-
cycle theory). Although they have only modest growth opportunities, these companies typically
offer high dividend yields to investors. See REILLY & BROWN, supra, at 910 fig.22.3.
176. Growth-oriented investors generally seek to invest in companies expected to grow at a
rate exceeding that of the general market. See LAWRENCE J. GITMAN & MICHAEL D. JOEHNK,
FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTING 202 (1981). They are focused primarily on a company's earnings
and its economic determinants. REILLY & BROWN, supra note 175, at 909. Attractive companies
are generally in the earlier stages of their life cycle and are often quite profitable. See FRANCIS,
supra note 175, at 570-72 (explaining the general arc of a company's life using the life-cycle
theory). Because these companies need to finance their future growth, earnings are typically
reinvested in the company rather than paid to shareholders. NANCY L. JACOB & R. RICHARD-
SON PETTIT, INVESTMENTS 418 (2d ed. 1988).
177. See Sauer, supra note 103, at 321 (stating that the "reasonable investor" standard offers
"no guidance as to how to obtain the views of that hypothetical being").
178. See id. ("Absent clear and often unavailable evidence as to how actual investors evalu-
ated the information at issue, defining the reasonable investor becomes an exercise in subjective
projection by the trier of fact.").
179. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
180. See, e.g., Wheat v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1976) ("Even sophisticated investors
are entitled to the protections of [Rule 10b-5]."); Welch Foods Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398
F. Supp. 1393, 1398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Large as well as small investors are protected by the
Securities Acts.").
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fairness and the jurisprudential principle that like cases should be
treated alike.' 8 While the conclusion drawn from the nebulous con-
cept of equality has enjoyed widespread acceptance, its underlying
justification is unpersuasive when applied to OTC derivatives
markets.
There is no need to assume that investors are identical or have the
same informational needs. As one scholar noted, "[I]nvestors are not
homogeneous." 182 It is widely acknowledged "that the range of po-
tentially material information is somewhat broader in the voting than
in the investment context."183 Differences in circumstances need not
be drastic to highlight the rule's shortcomings. The relative impor-
tance of a single piece of information may change based on.the inves-
tor's investment strategy or the disclosing entity's industry, market
sector, or position in its life cycle.184 Not only are these distinctions
limitless, they are also fluid and may change over time. Materiality,
much like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder.
This suggests that the Court's implicit premise that a single standard
of materiality must govern all securities transactions should be re-
jected. Indeed, both Congress and the courts have found room to
draw distinctions between investors in other areas of securities law. 85
Examples can be found in the Court's interpretation of § 4(2) of the
1933 Act' 8 6 and in the treatment of accredited investors and qualified
institutional buyers. 87
1. Private Offerings
Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act exempts "transactions by any issuer not
involving any public offering" from its general registration require-
ments.' 8 Because the Act fails to provide guidance in defining a
181. E.g., ARISTOTLE'S, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. E, 1131a (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans.,
1984); see also John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLuM. L. REV. 1,
29-30 (2001).
182. Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure and Materiality, 48
CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 98 (1998).
183. Lee, supra note 114, at 675 (quoting James D. Redwood, Qualitative Materiality Under
the SEC Proxy Rules and the Fifth Amendment: A Disclosure Accident Waiting to Happen or
Two Ships Passing in the Night?, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 315, 336).
184. See Sauer, supra note 103, at 321.
185. See infra notes 188-203 and accompanying text.
186. Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 4, 48 Stat. 74, 77 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2)) (ex-
empting "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering" from the registration re-
quirements of 15 U.S.C. § 77e).
187. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2011) (defining an accredited investor); id. § 230.144A(a)
(defining a qualified institutional buyer).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
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"public offering,"189 courts have interpreted the section with an eye
toward the provision's statutory purpose.190 In SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., the Supreme Court stated that the availability of § 4(2)'s exemp-
tion ultimately turns "on whether the particular class of persons af-
fected needs the protection of the Act." 191 Accordingly, it focused
"on the need of the offerees for the protections afforded by registra-
tion." 192 Transactions involving "those who are shown to be able to
fend for themselves" fall beyond the boundaries of a public offering
and are exempted from the attendant registration requirements.19 3
The Ralston Purina Court cited investor sophistication and access to
information as two factors to consider when determining whether a
plaintiff is able to fend for herself.194
Subsequent cases have clarified the appropriate role of investor so-
phistication in this context.195 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that general sophistication is necessary but
insufficient by itself to justify exemption.196 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit has similarly held that
sophistication is not a substitute for access to the kind of infor-
mation which registration would disclose. . . . A purchaser of unre-
gistered stock must be shown to have been in a position to acquire
[detailed knowledge of the company and its affairs to make possible
an informed investment decision] about the issuer. 197
2. Accredited Investors and Qualified Institutional Buyers
"Accredited investor" and "qualified institutional buyer" provisions
also draw distinctions based on financial sophistication. Although in-
dividual investors may qualify by meeting certain net worth or income
189. E.g., Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963).
190. E.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt.
Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977).
191. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125.
192. Id. at 127.
193. Id. at 125.
194. See id. at 125-26.
195. See Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688-90 (5th Cir. 1971);
SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 4, 10 (D.D.C. 1996) ("[C]ourts consider the number of
offerees, the relationship of the offerees to each other and the issuer, the manner of the offering
(that is, solicitation), information disclosure or access, and the sophistication of the offerees.");
Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1111-12 (D. Mass. 1974).
196. Hill York Corp., 448 F.2d at 690; Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294, 300 (N.D. Tex.
1974) ("[Tlhe exemption is not dependent on the sophistication of the offerees but whether they
had access to all of the information which a registration statement would have provided.").
197. United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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requirements,' 98 accredited investors are typically sophisticated finan-
cial institutions.' 99 Accredited investors operate in the financial mar-
kets with fewer restrictions than ordinary investors, but they also
operate with diminished protections. 200 Federal regulations presume
these investors possess sufficient financial knowledge and business ex-
perience to adequately evaluate the risks and merits of prospective
investments without legal intervention.
The requirements to be considered a qualified institutional buyer
are even more restrictive than those for an accredited investor.201 To
be a qualified institutional buyer, an entity must be of a specific type
and own and invest at least $100 million in securities on a discretion-
ary basis. 202 Once an entity becomes a qualified institutional buyer, it
has greater access to capital and the trading markets, and it may par-
ticipate in transactions unavailable to ordinary investors. 203
The logic behind these statutory exceptions is apparent-these in-
vestors are able to fend for themselves and therefore do not require
statutory protection to effectively guard their interests. The excep-
tions demonstrate the willingness of Congress and the judiciary to rec-
ognize differences between investors on the basis of their
sophistication, discrediting the courts' insistence that all investors are
entitled to the same legal protection. Although these exceptions may
seem insignificant in relation to the total number of participants in the
financial markets, their underlying reasoning is far from trivial and
carries equal force in the context of materiality determinations.
The exceptions do, however, raise questions regarding the appropri-
ate conception of investor sophistication. Investors may qualify as ac-
credited investors or qualified institutional buyers based solely on
198. "Any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's
spouse" exceeds $1,000,000 at the time of purchase is considered an accredited investor. 17
C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2011). "Any natural person who had an individual income in excess of
$200,000 .. . or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of [the two
most recent years]" would qualify as an accredited investor. Id. § 230.501(a)(6).
199. See id. § 230.501(a)(1)-(8) (listing banks, registered brokers and dealers, insurance com-
panies, investment companies, certain governmental or private employee-benefit plans, and
some business trusts or partnerships as entities that may qualify as accredited investors).
200. Regulations provide a safe harbor for Section 4(2)'s registration requirements so long as
the unregistered securities are offered to thirty-five or fewer unaccredited investors. Id.
§ 230.506(b)(2)(i). No corresponding limit is posed on similar sales to accredited investors. Ad-
ditionally, if an issuer sells stock to unaccredited purchasers, it must provide information, such as
audited financial statements, to the purchaser. Id. § 230.502(b)(1).
201. See id. § 230.144A(a)(1) (defining qualified institutional buyer).
202. Id. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i).
203. See id. § 230.144A(d). Qualified institutional buyers may purchase shares of unregis-
tered securities if the offer is made only to qualified institutional buyers or those reasonably
thought by the offeror to be qualified institutional buyers. Id. § 230.144A(d)(1).
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their indicia of sophistication, rather than their actual level of sophisti-
cation.2 0 4 Such investors thereby gain their statutory sophistication
simply by virtue of their wealth.
Thus, there are two possible methods to account for investor sophis-
tication. The strict, rule-based approach displayed by the accredited
investor and qualified institutional buyer provisions is easy to adminis-
ter and creates easily discernable guidelines demarcating the bounda-
ries of sophistication. This allows parties to better structure their
conduct in light of their expected treatment by the law. However, this
indirect approach runs contrary to the principles of Basic and SAB
No. 99; namely, that any boundary, even if tightly drawn, would likely
be both overinclusive and underinclusive. 205 When put into practice,
it would afford protection to investors who do not need it and deny it
to those who do.
The direct approach used in Ralston Purina-which looks to the
investors' actual sophistication-may better reflect the dynamics of fi-
nancial transactions and more faithfully uphold the intent of Con-
gress. This approach, however, may reduce the ability of parties to
foresee the expected legal consequences of their actions and plan ac-
cordingly. The fine-grain analysis may also require substantial admin-
istrative and judicial resources.
C. The Inclusion of Subjective Considerations
The purely objective standard suffers from pitfalls when put into
practice. Case law concerning materiality has been wildly inconsis-
tent.20 6 At least one commentator has attributed the doctrinal confu-
sion to courts' manipulation of materiality. 207 According to this
argument, judges use materiality as a "safety valve" to alleviate ad-
ministrative concerns and discourage claims they deem as nonmerito-
rious, rather than to define the scope of conduct giving rise to
liability. 208 This Comment credits that broad contention, but takes is-
sue with a much narrower point. It submits that the doctrinal incon-
sistency is borne not from the inclusion of policy concerns, but from
the lack of a framework with which to evaluate such considerations.
This point is explored in the following subsections.
204. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (stating the requirements to be considered an accredited in-
vestor); id. § 230.144A(a) (stating the requirements to be considered a qualified institutional
buyer).
205. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988); accord SAB No. 99, supra note 162, at
45,151 (cautioning against exclusive reliance on bright-line rules).
206. See supra notes 105-159 and accompanying text.
207. Padfield, supra note 138, at 146-47.
208. Id. at 147.
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1. A Stronger Positive Impact
Courts have routinely looked to policy considerations when inter-
preting the securities laws, often doing so conspicuously and explic-
itly.209 This alone gives no reason for pause. The problem, at least in
relation to materiality, is that courts have no framework with which to
incorporate such policy concerns in their analyses. Judges are left to
make materiality determinations using little more than their personal
beliefs, many of which may not comport with the principles of the
Securities Acts. The lack of coherence in the resulting case law should
come as no surprise. A simple, straightforward solution is to establish
guideposts to which courts can orient their analyses. Allowing courts
to consider the financial sophistication and resources of the transact-
ing parties in OTC derivates transactions would provide such
guidance.
The only "guidance" the current test provides to courts is to con-
sider the information within the "totality of the circumstances." Such
decisions are notoriously difficult to make,210 primarily because, as
one court candidly admitted, "no one knows what moves or does not
move the mythical 'average prudent investor." 211 Consequently, ma-
teriality determinations are often of such an ad hoc, haphazard nature
that they provide little guidance to future courts and have limited
precedential value for later decisions. 2 12
Including a subjective component to materiality would obviate the
need to divine characteristics of the hypothetical "reasonable inves-
tor" and would provide a concrete factor for courts to consider: the
characteristics of the investor receiving or in need of the information.
This would constrain the unbridled discretion of a court in applying a
totality of the circumstances analysis. No longer would judges,
animated only by their personal biases or viewpoints, be able to pre-
clude a trier of fact from considering the importance of the misrepre-
sented or omitted information. 213 Instead, its analysis would be
limited to the facts presented to the court. At the same time, future
209. E.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976); SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953).
210. Sauer, supra note 103, at 319 ("[M]ateriality is a hard [thing] for all of us to get our arms
around." (second alteration in original) (quoting Phyllis Diamond, SEC Enforcement: More
REG FD Cases in Pipeline, Beller Says at Lawyers' Gathering, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
1878 (Nov. 14, 2005))).
211. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
212. Sauer, supra note 103, at 319.
213. Some rightly find judges' ability to keep materality determinations from juries particu-
larly troubling, given the Supreme Court's emphasis on the fact-sensitive nature of materiality
determinations.
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courts could be confident that past materiality determinations were
based solely on legitimate considerations, thereby increasing their
precedential value.
But courts are not the only parties to reap the benefits of the addi-
tional guidance that including a subjective component would provide.
Executives and corporate counsel, faced with the daunting decision of
whether or not to disclose information, also struggle to grasp the con-
cept of materiality. 214 With the inclusion of a subjective standard,
such parties could inform their decisions with meaningful precedents
set by past materiality determinations, which would likely bring a de-
gree of certainty to predictions regarding the legal implications of
their disclosure decisions. To the extent that a situation involves novel
circumstances, corporate counsel would be comforted by the fact that
their ex ante analysis will closely mirror that undertaken by the court
ex post. When making their respective materiality determinations,
both parties would be looking to the plaintiff's characteristics, thereby
helping counsel navigate through uncharted waters.
2. Administrative Concerns
Courts and investors could likely reap these benefits at little addi-
tional expense.215 Admittedly, facts concerning a plaintiff's resources
and financial expertise would undoubtedly be made relevant to mate-
riality determinations under a subjective approach, which could po-
tentially increase the costs of discovery and expend judicial resources
when used in trials. Many of these same facts, however, are already
considered in connection with the other elements of a Rule 10b-5
claim, particularly that of reliance. Virtually all courts-even those
not using the majority's reasonable- or justifiable-reliance rubric-
have explicitly acknowledged that a plaintiff's "sophistication and ex-
pertise" are factors to consider when determining whether gauging a
plaintiff's reliance on an alleged misrepresentation. 216 It is therefore
214. E.g., Victor Brudney, A Note of Materiality and Soft Information Under Federal Securities
Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 726 (1989); Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-
Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 632
(1997) (noting the epistemological difficulties of securities lawyers in finding the "truth" about
an issuer).
215. A party would have to assess the sophistication of its counterpart before availing itself of
the reduced disclosure requirement under a subjective standard. This inquiry would likely come
at some cost to the investor. Under the standard proposed by this Comment, the investor could
still forego this analysis and have its disclosure decisions subjected to the current objective stan-
dard. See discussion infra Part III.D. More to the point, Basic stands for the proposition that
Congress's clearly manifested policy decisions trump concerns over judicial administration.
216. E.g., Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530 (7th Cir.
1985); G. A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 955 (5th Cir. 1981).
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unlikely that a subjective formulation of materiality would signifi-
cantly expand the scope of discovery or issues contested at trial by
courts in these jurisdictions. Thus, concern of potentially increasing
the duration or cost of securities litigation is likely overblown.
3. Sub]ective Materiality in OTC Derivatives Markets
The OTC derivatives markets, which foster the trading of customiz-
able instruments through negotiation, seem to be an appropriate fo-
rum for the inclusion of a subjective component. Because of the
limited number of parties involved in a transaction, investors may fea-
sibly engage in a more tailored analysis of their counterparty's sophis-
tication. The same cannot be said of traditional disclosure settings,
such as proxy solicitations, when disclosures are simultaneously dis-
tributed to millions of investors.
The prevalence of sophisticated, institutional investors also counsels
in favor of including a subject component of materiality in OTC deriv-
atives markets transactions. Courts are clearly reticent to leave de-
fenseless investors without the protection afforded by the Securities
Acts, as shown by courts holding that the presence of a single unso-
phisticated offeree precludes the protection of § 4(2)'s exemption.217
It may well be true that the Securities Acts protect "[1]arge as well as
small investors," 218 but this concern for the fundamental fairness of
the markets carries with it an important qualification: the protections
of the Securities Acts will be available to investors only so long as they
need them. The Acts exhibit Congress's desire "to protect investors
who do not have access to inside information and who are not in a
position to protect themselves from fraud." 219 Financial expertise
bears directly on an investor's need for such protection, and the ma-
jority of OTC derivatives investors possess the resources to conduct
thorough due diligence of potential risks without governmental
intervention.
This is not to say that the composition and characteristics of OTC
derivatives markets fundamentally alter the policy values embodied in
217. See SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 95,229 at 98,211 ("[D]efendant failed to establish that all of those who purchased UMI
common stock or received stock for value belonged to a class of persons who could 'fend' for
themselves."); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 645 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The party claiming the ex-
emption must show that it is met not only with respect to each purchaser, but also with respect to
each offeree." (citing Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971))).
218. Welch Foods Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393, 1398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
see also Wheat v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1976) ("Even sophisticated investors are
entitled to the protections of [Rule lOb-5].").
219. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 698 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the Securities Acts; rather, the relative absence of unsophisticated in-
vestors may alter the application of such policy considerations. As a
general proposition, courts have routinely stated that a fundamental
purpose of their enactment was "to substitute a philosophy of full dis-
closure for the philosophy of caveat emptor."220 Yet, President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt's message to Congress provides a more complete
articulation of the nuanced motivations prompting the enactment of
the Securities Acts:
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the fur-
ther doctrine, "Let the seller also beware." It puts the burden of
telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to hon-
est dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence.
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public
with the least possible interference to honest business.221
These comments suggest that obligations rest with both parties to a
transaction, placing recipients and disclosing parties on level ground
only with respect to facts.222 This was done, however, to provide an
equal footing from which parties may arrive at independent con-
clusions regarding a security's attractiveness. 223
One investor's failure to adequately consider the risks of a security
does not implicate the interests protected by the Securities Acts. As
the Ninth Circuit stated, "The purpose of the [1934] Act is to protect
the innocent investor, not one who loses his innocence and then waits
to see how his investment turns out before he decides to invoke the
provisions of the Act."224 The best way to distinguish between these
two hypothetical investors is to look to the parties' sophistication and
the resources they employed or were capable of employing in making
their investment decision.
220. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
221. 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
222. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) ("It shall be unlawful for any person ... to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact . . . ." (emphasis added)).
223. From an economic perspective, the stock market may be viewed as a pricing mechanism,
allowing shareholders to accurately assess the value of the shares they own. Louis Lowenstein,
Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249,
254 (1983). The different perspectives, and the conclusions that they produce, may better reflect
all information in the market than a single viewpoint held by all investors. See Rana Foroohar,
Uncertainty? Don't Be So Sure, TIME, Oct. 31, 2011, at 28. Capturing these perspectives would
improve the functioning of the market and better allow shareholders to determine the value of
their investment.
224. Royal Air Props., Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1962).
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D. The Prudent Investor Rule: A Working Example
This Comment proposes a framework for materiality determina-
tions in OTC derivatives markets analogous to trust law's prudent in-
vestor rule, 225 which requires trustees to "manage the funds of the
trust as a prudent investor would." 226 The Restatement (Third) of
Trusts measures trustees objectively while still taking into account a
trustee's characteristics and abilities.227 The Restatement sets out, es-
sentially, a two-tiered framework. All trustees, regardless of their
skills or abilities, must meet an objective minimum standard of care.2 2 8
Additionally, those with "a degree of skill greater than that of an indi-
vidual of ordinary intelligence" must make use of those extraordinary
skills.229
The standard of materiality advocated in this Comment would im-
pose a similar framework.for disclosure decisions in the OTC deriva-
tives markets. The objective standard limits the amount of disclosure
required, regardless of the counterparty's actual financial sophistica-
tion.230 Recipients of disclosures are encouraged to undertake the ap-
propriate due diligence before making investment decisions because
the failure to do so will preclude recovery. If strictly applied by
courts, the current approach allows sophisticated institutional inves-
tors with greater resources and expertise to recover for failing to make
use of skills that exceed those of the ordinary investor, thereby dis-
couraging the full utilization of their expertise. The proposed stan-
dard would relieve defendants from liability when plaintiffs (the
recipients of disclosures) fail to perform due diligence commensurate
with their sophistication and expertise.
225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007). The genesis of the prudent investor
rule comes from dicta in Harvard College v. Amory, an 1830 decision from the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. See 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830); see also Paul G. Haskell, The
Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 87, 88
(1990). The prudent investor rule has undergone a shift toward a more liberal, fact-specific
standard with the publication of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr.,
Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 77 IowA L. REv. 1151, 1155 (1992) (stating that
the "modest reformulation" of the prudent investor rule in the Restatement (Third) was meant to
return Harvard College's "intended generality and flexibility").
226. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007).
227. See id. § 90 cmt. d.
228. Id.; see also Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Gardiner, 733 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Ariz.
1987) ("The standard of care required, however, is measured objectively. The trustee must be
reasonable in her delegation." (citation omitted)).
229. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. d (2007); see also Coberly v. Superior Court
of L.A. Cnty., 42 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) ("Trustees are bound to use such talents
as they possess.").
230. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality in
terms of "the reasonable investor").
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Comparing the reasonable investor rule of securities law with the
prudent investor rule of trust law leads to a paradoxical result. As the
law currently stands, a financially sophisticated plaintiff alleging a fail-
ure to disclose material information in an arms-length transaction-
where no fiduciary duty exists between parties-is more likely to re-
cover than an unsophisticated beneficiary claiming violations by a
trustee. The law has no problem requiring a trustee to make reason-
able use of his talents, but fails to require the same of investors seek-
ing the protection of the Securities Acts.
Admittedly, the additional duties imposed by the Restatement
(Third) are rooted in the nature of the trustee's fiduciary relationship
with the beneficiary. 231 However, the Restatement's position is also
buttressed by "sound policy." 232 Encouraging investors to make full
use of their abilities in assessing the risks they undertake surely falls
within the bounds of sound policy, especially when considering the
systemic risks created by OTC derivatives products.233 The drafters of
the Securities Acts, having just gone through the 1929 crash, showed
tremendous concern for the efficiency and stability of the financial
markets. The most recent financial crisis should provide the judiciary
the same acute awareness.
Finally, trust law's updated prudent investor rule also demonstrates
that a newer, liberalized standard is workable. The National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, building from the
principles enshrined in the Restatement (Third), drafted a modernized
Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA). 234 The updated UPIA adopts
the two-tiered framework discussed above, and thus far, over forty
states have enacted the UPIA in whole or significant part.235 This
widespread acceptance lends support to the standard that this Com-
ment proposes for materiality determinations in disputes arising from
OTC derivatives markets.
IV. IMPACT
The litigation involving Goldman is unlikely to be an isolated event.
Not long after Goldman reached its settlement agreement with the
SEC, Citigroup Inc. "agreed to pay $75 million to settle SEC charges
231. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. d (2007).
232. Id.
233. Kristen N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82
COLo. L. REV. 167, 190 (2011).
234. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR Acr (1995) (Prefatory Note).
235. Legislative Fact Sheet-Prudent Investor Act, NAT'L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF. ST.
LAws, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Prudent%201nvestor%2OAct (last
visited Oct. 19, 2011).
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of understating its subprime exposure in response to investors." 236 A
wave of possible litigation related to allegedly fraudulent business
practices has loomed large in the wake of the most recent financial
crisis. 237 As famed investor Warren Buffett stated, "It's only when the
tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked.""23
One of the largest issuers of mortgage-backed CDOs during the fi-
nancial meltdown was Deutsche Bank (Deutsche). 239 Much like
Goldman, Deutsche sold the mortgage-backed CDOs it created to
some of its clients while advising others to bet against the housing
market and doing the same with its own accounts.240 One client tak-
ing issue with this practice was M&T Bank Corp. (M&T), which pur-
chased $82 million of CDOs from Deutsche in March 2007.241 Little
more than a year later, the value of M&T's investment had dropped
by more than ninety-five percent. 242 In response to its losses, M&T
filed suit under multiple theories, 243 alleging that Deutsche wrongfully
stated that the bonds' "underlying structures [were] built to withstand
adverse conditions." 244 It also alleged that Deutsche was aware of the
issues with its underwriting standards and had withheld that informa-
tion from the credit-rating agencies.245 Deutsche, however, main-
tained that it had clearly warned that the underlying assets to which
the CDOs were referenced were of poor quality.246
Deutsche's alleged conduct, if proved at trial, could constitute at
least two violations of federal securities laws; its assurances of the
soundness and safety of the CDOs' underlying portfolio could be a
material misrepresentation, and its failure to inform M&T of its dete-
riorated underwriting standards could be a material omission. Assum-
ing that the court accepted M&T's allegations, it would then delve
into the materiality of the information.
Taking an objective view of Deutsche's misrepresentation, the infor-
mation would almost certainly be material. The risk undertaken in
236. Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, Dual Role in Housing Deals Puts Spotlight on
Deutsche, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2010, at Al.
237. See Hodgson & Nissen, supra note 3.
238. Indecent Exposure: Markets Reveals the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, ECONOMIST.COM
(Aug. 5, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/9609521.
239. See Mollenkamp & Ng, supra note 236.
240. Id.
241. M & T Bank Corp. v. Gemstone CDO VII, Ltd., 891 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (App. Div. 2009).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. M & T Bank Corp. v. Gemstone CDO VII, Ltd., No. 7064/08, 2009 U.S. N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 710, at *10 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2009).
245. Id. at *11.
246. Id. at *13.
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exchange for potential profits lies at the heart of any investment de-
cision. It would therefore be reasonable for an investor to use an as-
sessment of the risk made by the party responsible for creating the
investment product to guide his course of action. In the language of
TSC Industries and Basic, such assurances would likely be viewed "as
having significantly altered the total mix of information made
available." 2 4 7
The result is less clear under a subjective approach and would likely
depend on any other information made available at the time the con-
tract was entered. The plaintiff's complaint notes the "overwhelming
emphasis" Deutche's preliminary circular placed on the rating
agency's assessment of the portfolio's relative safety and low risk.2 4 8
Assuming the agency's findings were accurately described in the circu-
lar and were arrived at independently, the alleged misrepresentations
could be immaterial. If M&T had access to the relevant information
regarding the underlying portfolio of mortgages, it would be more dif-
ficult to argue that the independent ratings altered the total mix of
information available to M&T. The company would have been able
to arrive at its own conclusion regarding the value and prospects of
the portfolio, just as Deutsche did. M&T's failure to adequately en-
gage in this analysis may preclude it from recovering under a subjec-
tive analysis. If this information were not available to M&T, it would
have an easier time demonstrating that the ratings included in the cir-
cular significantly altered the mix of available information.
This example highlights the need for a fully developed factual re-
cord. It also demonstrates one possible drawback of a subjective ap-
proach. Looking to the total mix of information made available to the
specific plaintiff may still require courts to assess some inferences cre-
ated by the facts. Even extensive discovery may fail to uncover all of
the information relevant to a plaintiff's investment process and the
factors weighed in making its decision. Courts, given the benefit of
hindsight, may overstate the effectiveness of due diligence in uncover-
ing all of the information to make an informed investment decision,
just as the signs of the impending financial crisis were easily visible in
retrospect.
Using a subjective lens to analyze the SEC's dispute with Goldman
discussed at the beginning of this Comment further highlights this
point. There, the key misrepresentation revolved around the role of
247. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
248. M & T Bank Corp., 2009 U.S. N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 710, at *10.
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the third party selecting a CDO's reference portfolio. 249 Goldman de-
scribed this third party as independent, while in actuality it was taking
the short side of the transaction, betting directly against the portfolio
it was creating.250
Goldman's strongest legal arguments are likely those advanced in
the media after the SEC's announcement of the case. 25 1 First, the
plaintiffs, as sophisticated investors, had to be aware that another
party was taking a position opposite from its own.2 52 The identity of
this party would likely be irrelevant because anyone willing to take
such a position would have a different assessment of the underlying
portfolio's prospects. Second, the plaintiffs were never precluded
from conducting their own assessment of the investment's risks and
should therefore bear the risk of failing to properly do So. 2 5 3 It is
unclear whether these arguments would be sufficient to avoid liability
without full discovery.
The plaintiffs would likely rely on the nonqualitative aspects of the
transaction to advance their position, claiming that they had no means
by which to discover the true role of the third party selecting the port-
folio. Given the opaqueness of the OTC derivatives market, these
claims may have merit. The plaintiffs would likely further allege that
they would not have entered into the contract had they known the
true role of the third party. It remains unclear how a court would
view this argument under a subjective approach. However, a purely
objective approach would likely produce a similarly unclear result.
Absent prior dealings involving similarly structured transactions or
explicit statements made by Goldman regarding the CDO's structure,
there would likely be little evidence to persuade the court one way or
the other. Because of Goldman's settlement agreement, the court's
treatment of this argument will remain a mystery. Indeed, this may be
Goldman's preferred result, given the number of Goldman clients that
would likely build their cases off an SEC victory at trial.
While predicting the outcome in materiality determinations remains
a difficult task, the consideration of subjective factors provides inves-
tors and the courts with a construct to frame their analysis. The bene-
fits of including a subjective component, however, go beyond these
individual disputes. Future investors of OTC derivatives would be
249. Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
250. Id.
251. See Craig & Scannell, supra note 2.
252. See, e.g., Craig et al., supra note 1; Ashby Jones et al., SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Vital Legal
Concept Key to Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2010, at A4.
253. See Jones et al., supra note 252.
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able to rely upon past determinations concerning a particular
counterparty (assuming that the party's resources or sophistication did
not change) and, further, would be able to analogize to other disputes,
as is commonly done under the common law. As this body of case law
develops, structure and certainty would replace the ambiguity so prev-
alent in materiality determinations currently.
V. CONCLUSION
The period leading up to the most recent financial crisis bears strik-
ing resemblance to the period leading up to the Great Depression.
Almost eighty years ago, the changing dynamics of the securities mar-
kets prompted Congress to dramatically reshape the regulatory frame-
work and enact the Securities Acts. A similar, albeit more modest,
adjustment is now needed to adequately address the newfound promi-
nence of the OTC derivatives markets.
The objective conception of materiality has spurred much litigation
but little clarity. The preceding analysis explains a fallacious premise
underlying the Court's resolution of these cases and demonstrates the
mental gymnastics in which courts must engage to envision the "rea-
sonable investor." This process is further complicated by the other
elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim and has resulted in unpredictability.
Adopting a subjective approach within the unique nature and dy-
namics of OTC derivatives transactions would allow courts to avoid at
least some of these issues by assessing the importance of information
in relation to the total mix of information to the plaintiff, rather than
the reasonable investor. Such an approach would satisfy the economic
underpinnings of the disclosure regime and more faithfully uphold the
motivating principles of the Securities Acts. It would also limit courts'
discretion in making materiality determinations to an analysis that
more closely mirrors that conducted by parties to OTC derivatives
transactions. As a result, judicial determinations would therefore
serve as more meaningful precedent and provide guidance to future
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investors in OTC derivatives markets. Just as important, the inclusion
of a subjective component would help bring some much-needed co-
herence to the courts' materiality jurisprudence.
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